




The earthquake and tsunami that attacked the northeast Japan on 11th March 
2011 seems to have significantly changed the society’s conditions of living for 
the present and future generations. This is because the biggest natural disaster 
in the history of modern Japan accompanied a high level industrial accident of 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants. The evaluation of the accident, based 
on the IAEA defined International Nuclear Events Scale (INES), soared to the 
level seven as early as 12th April 2011, the worst standard comparable to the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident. The Japanese government estimates that it would 
take more than thirty years to complete the decommissioning of the troubled 
nuclear reactors. Now that residents near the plant site and the neighbouring 
communities in Tohoku and Kanto regions suffer radioactive contamination of 
their living environment. A significant number of farmers and fishermen in the 
affected areas lost their livelihoods; residents near the plant site were forced to 
evacuate their home towns and villages with little prospect of returning; and 
those remaining there, including children, schoolboys and schoolgirls as well as 
pregnant women, are continuously exposed to the risks and fears of radiation. 
 The Fukushima accident changed the society’s capacity of giving and 
distributing life chances to its members. It laid bare a situation in which a 
whole nation has to design their course of life, both individual and collective, 
with permanent care of managing radiation as well as unequal distribution of 
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nuclear-related risks, fears and discrimination. As philosopher Osamu Nishitani 
remarks, ‘the post-March 11 Japan is totally different from the previous period 
in that the possibility of the future is already constrained by actual and potential 
risks of radioactive contamination’ (Nishitani, 16th July, 2011).
The event of March 11 eventually opened up a space for reexamining and 
reevaluating the existing Japanese development model. In the wake of the 
Fukushima accident, academy, journalism and civil society began to discuss 
the problems of post-war Japanese development model, together with energy 
shift and denuclearization. For those who are critical of Japanese nuclear energy 
policy, the Fukushima accident can be qualified as an environmental and social 
disaster perpetrated by the modernist development projects, which is comparable 
to big pollutions in Japanese history (Ashio, Minamata and Yokkaichi) and the 
military base of Okinawa. They problematize the historical structure of post-war 
Japanese political economy that has hitherto pursued the growth of industrial 
activities and material wealth at the expense of multifarious victims in the 
peripheries.
In this context it is not difficult to find an overlap between the current 
growing concern about denuclearization in Japan and the post-development 
critique of the paradigm of development. For the Fukushima accident has 
revealed to Japanese people the structural violence and injustice associated 
with modernist development projects, which forms and effects one can find 
in the various cases discussed in the critical and post-colonial development 
studies literature(1) : psychological and politico-economic dependency of rural 
economy to urban industry; discrimination and destruction of the livelihood of 
traditional farmers and fishermen; top-down development policies; deprivation 
of local cultures; dominance of techno-science; and loss of autonomy. And 
There are already a bulk of monographs and articles related to these fields. I shall introduce 
only several basic, and relatively recent, works for heuristic purpose. For critical and post-
colonial development studies, see, for example, Arce & Long (2000), Crush (1995), Edelman 






the post-development critique and its related fields such as anthropologies of 
development and modernity and post-colonial and subaltern studies have long 
since investigated the origins and nature of these multifarious problems(2). What 
is peculiar to the post-March 11 Japan, however, is that these structural violence 
and injustice are entwined with the characteristic phenomena of advanced 
industrial societies of late modernity: what Ulrich Beck calls risk society (Beck, 
1992). From Three Mile islands to Chernobyl to Fukushima, nuclear accident 
illustrates the existence of the incalculable side-effects of scientifically and 
technologically produced risks in the industrial societies that enjoy material 
abundance and comfort. In this sense the Fukushima accident urges us to 
critically examine the model of those technology-based consumerist societies.
We must question the foundation of consumerist societies, and especially 
its organizing logic and principle, because industrial disasters like Chernobyl 
and Fukushima illustrate the structural, ethical, limits of modern industrial 
civilization. Whereas the cultural value of nineteenth century industrial revolution 
lied in a firm conviction that the development of material production and 
scientific and technological advancement led to the progress of human societies, 
the opposite happens in the societies of consumers. That today’s advanced 
industrial societies are exposed to multifarious risks produced by scientific 
technology and industrial systems suggests that the growth of material wealth 
is no longer conceived of as a marker of social progress; we are becoming more 
and more uncertain about the future, losing confidence in what we are actually 
doing. As Jean-Pierre Dupuy remarks, ‘we are today in a totally different 
situation because major problem is to avoid ultimate catastrophe’ (Dupuy, 2010, 
p. 81, my translation). 
The prevalence of risk society thus suggests two things. First, it suggests 
that we need to abandon the lingering myth of modernization that so-called 
developed countries represent the ideal model of living. It is needed to recognize 
For the trajectory and summary of the influence of anthropologies of development and 
modernity and post-colonial and subaltern studies on post-development critique, see Escobar 
(1995) (2009) and Tommasoli (2004)
(2)
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that advanced industrial societies are socially and ecologically unsustainable 
due to a great many risks involved in their economic activities. Second, given 
that recognition, we need to reexamine and reevaluate epistemological and 
normative foundations of developmental philosophy: it is needed to reconstruct 
development ethics, based on the totally different paradigmatic principles from 
the modernist development paradigm. 
In what follows, I examine ethical problems associated with the modern 
paradigm of development through the lens of post-development critique of 
technology. Technology is one of the central issues in the post-development 
literature but it remains less focused in the academic debate on post-
development(3). However, the issue of technology plays a crucial role in 
understanding the structural and ethical problems of development and also in 
examining the potential of post-development critique. The second section begins 
with a short introduction of the post-development critique of technology, 
followed by an interpretation of Castoriadis’ reflection on the ancient Greek 
concept of technique. In doing so, this section recasts our focus on technology 
from its modern understanding, i.e. technology as instrument or machine of 
production, to the authentic notion of technique as practice of constituting 
the human world. The third section examines the problems associated 
with modern technology, drawing on Castoriadis’ and Arednt’s works. The 
fourth section extends the arguments in the previous sections to the issue of 
development. Here I develop Latouche’s critique of sustainable development 
with Arendt and argue that the modern paradigm of development exacerbates 
not only social and ecological but also political condition of sustainability. In 
the concluding section, I make a special remark on the Fukushima crisis and 
For the comprehensive summary of academic debate on post-development, see Ziai (2007). 
This book contains critical examinations of post-development critique. Contributors, including 
myself, scrutinize the issues of culture, economy, politics and research methods, analysed and 
proposed by post-development scholars. However the issue of technology is not discussed as a 
main topic. Similarly, the aforementioned critical and post-colonial development studies have 





present ethical and political challenges that must be tackled in the study of post-
development.
II. Fundamental Questions of Technology: Interpreting Castoriadis’ 
Philosophy 
A distinct contribution of post-development critique to the study of 
international development lies in that it brings to light epistemological and 
ontological problems associated with modernity and development. Post-
development literature offers a historical description of how a trinity of the 
modern ideas of economy, science and technology gave birth to a productivist 
political economic regime in the wake of industrial revolution and how these 
ideas and institutions were globalized through colonization and post-war 
international development projects (Escobar, 1995; Illich, 1973a; Latouche, 
1986, 1989; Rist, 2008; Sachs, 1992). 
Post-development scholars explain that the existing economic, scientific 
and technological ideas and institutions reflect particular values of modern 
Western civilization. They argue that, by defining the material prosperity 
enjoyed by advanced industrial societies as a universal goal of humanity, 
development projects reinforce, on a symbolic level, the supremacy of Western 
civilization over non-European cultures whilst, in practice, destroying cultural 
and ecological diversities in the post-colonial world through the programs of 
modernization and neoliberal globalization. 
Critique of technology is of singular importance for post-development, as 
it illuminates the fundamental problem of development more clearly than those 
critiques associated with science and economy. This is because, in some of post-
development literature, the issue of technology is examined in its authentic 
theme, i.e. praxis, in contradistinction to narrow modern understanding of 
technology as instrument or machine of production.
To understand the core idea of post-development critique of technology, it is 
necessary to refer to the works of precursors, namely Cornelius Castoriadis (1975, 
1978), Jacques Ellul (1977, 1987), André Gorz (1975, 1988), and Ivan Illich 
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(1973a, 1973b). Their works, chiefly produced during the 1970s and 1980s, shed 
light on the historical process in which scientific and technological advancement 
and corresponding rise of productivity engender the deterioration of quality of 
life of advanced industrial societies. The paradox of well-being, they argue, is 
attributed to a peculiar configuration of science, technology and economy under 
the paradigm of development. In effect, the actually exiting development of 
industrial system proceeded in ways advanced scientific technology is applied to 
production without considering its side-effects on human subsistence and eco-
system.
What these critics have in common is that they discuss technology not in 
terms of the performance of particular instrument or machine used in this or 
that particular development project but in terms of the mode of social ordering 
involved in adopting a series of technologies. In other words, they examined 
technology in the light of its effects on the systematization of the social field, 
as is exemplified in Ellul’s definition of late twentieth century technology as a 
‘system’ (Ellul, 1977). In particular they focused on the social and technological 
framing of human practices and the way it conditions the possibility of life.
Why did they investigate technology in such way? This is because 
technology, understood in its most original sense, is closely associated with the 
dimensions of human practices and social ordering. Castoriadis’ reflection on the 
ancient Greek notion of technique helps us to understand this point.
For his part Castoriadis conceives society as a product of what he calls ‘social 
imaginary significations’: imaginary significations ‘animate society’s institutions’ 
and ‘hold society together’ (Castoriadis, 1991b, p. 221). As he explains, social 
imaginary significations consist of two distinct but mutually complementary 
principles: legein and teukhein (Castoriadis, 1975, pp. 327-399). On the one 
hand, legein refers to the logic of ‘distinguishing, choosing, posing, assembling, 
counting and saying’ (p. 330). It constructs identity through representation 
and language, i.e. logos. It makes things visible, representing them as distinct 
objects (p. 330, pp. 335-338). Legein thus determines boundaries between what 




of ‘assembling, adjusting, fabricating and constructing’ (p. 383), It arranges 
things and connects them to one another in fabricating identity. Thus teukhein 
is immanent to legein and functions as eidos, that which gives an ideality and a 
finality of beings (p. 386). It produces and transforms social relations, bringing 
forth what is still not present. Hence, teukhein introduces another division to 
society: possibility and impossibility of being, i.e. what is able to do and what 
is unable to do in the society. According to Castoriadis the ancient Greek word 
techné, the etymological origin of technique, is derived from teukhein and 
designates one of its aspects (p. 383). 
Castoriadis’ insights suggest that one should not see technique as particular 
instrument or tool, still less technology, i.e. the machine of production that 
follows instrumental rationality immanent to economic and scientific activities. 
Rather, technique is an existential and ontological logic that constructs social 
relations and human, both individual and collective, capacity. Put it in the 
phenomenological term, technique enacts the possibilisation of being. 
The technique understood in this way is conceived of as a concept 
highlighting particular dimensions of social ordering, which gives contents 
to heteronomy and autonomy. To begin with, Castoriadis defines heteronomy 
as a type of social stability in which there is no possibility of questioning the 
legitimacy of existing social order. In this sense, ‘almost everywhere societies 
have lived in a state of instituted heteronomy’ (Castoriadis, 1991a, p. 162). As 
he continues;
An essential constituent of this state is the instituted representation of an 
extrasocial source of nomos. In this respect, religion plays a central role. It 
supplies a representation of this source and of its attributes, it ensures that 
all significations — those pertaining to the world as well as those pertaining 
to human affairs — spring from the same origin, it cements the whole by 




For Castoriadis, the problem of heteronomous state lies in its denial of instituting 
dimension of society, i.e. the reduction of existing social order to a natural order 
and the rejection of the possibility that society could have been constructed 
otherwise. He therefore criticizes the notion of tradition because ‘[t]radition 
means that the question of legitimacy of tradition shall not be raised. Individual 
in those societies are fabricated in such a way that this question remains for 
them mentally and psychically inconceivable’ (p. 163).
In contrast, autonomy means an act of questioning such heteronomous state; 
it is a source of social change.
Autonomy comes from autos-nomos: (to give to) oneself one’s laws. After 
what has been said about heteronomy it is hardly necessary to add: to make 
one’s own laws, knowing that one is doing so. This is a new eidos within the 
overall history of being: a type of being that reflectively gives to itself the 
laws of its being. (p. 163)
 
Castoriadis’ notion of autonomy thus refers to a societal project of remaking 
social order, in contradistinction to a modern, Kantian, notion of autonomy qua 
a freedom of the will of individual human agency. It is principally concerned 
with openness of social ontology, as he stipulates elsewhere:
Autonomy is not closure but, rather, opening: ontological opening, the 
possibility of going beyond the informational, cognitive, and organizational 
closure characteristic of self-constituting, but heteronomous beings. It is 
ontological opening, since to go beyond this closure signifies altering the 
already existing cognitive and organizational ‘system’, therefore constituting 
one’s world and one’s self according to other laws, therefore creating a new 
ontological eidos, another self in another world. (Castoriadis, 1997b, p. 310)
In a situation of autonomy, people are able to institute their society by 




giving laws to the act of creating new eidos, which is a function of teukhein. It 
follows from this that autonomy is closely associated with society’s capacity 
of assembling, adjusting, fabricating and constructing social relations, as well 
as the capability of its members. In short autonomy is a particular mode and 
manifestation of technique that is shared by society as a whole. 
Castoriadis’ insights are more clearly explained by recourse to Hannah 
Arendt’s philosophy. For her part Arendt observes that speech and action are 
distinct features that constituted ancient Greek polis life (Arendt, 1958, p. 178). 
The Arendtian concept of politics refers to a practice of making a space in which 
each and every person presents oneself in front of others by acknowledging 
his/her worldly relationship with them; it is a practice of making the common 
world in which the plurality of humans coexists under the principle of equality 
as freedom (pp. 30-32). Arendt stresses that to make the common world requires 
communication between humans and that that communication is established 
through human faculties of speaking and acting. Speech and action make it 
possible for each and every person to disclose oneself in their singularities, i.e. 
question of Who, instead of his established social position and status, ‘What 
that somebody is’ (pp. 179-80). A person enters a web of relationship through 
his deed and word; politics is a practice of constructing the common world, 
which is irreducible to other human institutions such as household (oikos) and 
everyday social activities (socius). Arendt also refers to the primordial definition 
of the word ‘interest’, which means ‘in-between persons’ and ‘binding together’, 
i.e. inter-est (p. 182). She remarks that speech and action are concerned with 
this sphere of in-between: ‘[m]ost action and speech is concerned with this in-
between, which varies with each group of people, so that most words and deeds 
are about some worldly objective reality in addition to being a disclosure of the 
acting and speaking agent’ (p. 182).
One can infer without difficulty that what Arendt describes in the term of 
speech is, for Castoriadis, a manifestation of legein, and action a manifestation 
of teukhein. For Castoriadis, technique refers to various practices of making 
relationship between humans; it is coterminous to Arendt’s concept of action 
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qua praxis. Such interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that he chastises 
Marx for establishing a neutral, scientific, definition of technique that reduces 
praxis to fabrication and production of material, and chiefly economic, 
objects (Castoriadis, 1978, pp. 297-300). It follows from this that to question 
technique in its most original sense means to question creative capacity of 
human practices, i.e. capacity of constituting the human world. Moreover, put in 
Arendt’s term, autonomy can be said to designate specific manner of making the 
common world, i.e. conditions and manifestation of freedom.
III. Problems of Modern Technology
The above discussion shows that technique concerns itself with the mode 
of social ordering and human practice, rather than the performance of particular 
instrument or machine. Once we acknowledge the issue of technique in this way, 
it is possible to reexamine and reevaluate the problems associated with modern 
technology and development more clearly.
To begin with, it is needed to understand a specific socio-historical 
circumstance in which the issue of technique qua technology, and its meaning 
and problematic, is formed in modernity. First of all, Castoriadis succinctly 
points to two types of imaginary significations constituting the modern society: 
that of unlimited expansion of pseudorational mastery over nature and humans; 
and that of the project of social and individual autonomy (Castoriadis, 1991b, 
p. 221). In reflecting on the historical evolution of the modern society from 
nineteenth century to late twentieth century, he illustrates how these two 
imaginary significations have become integrated into the imaginary signification 
of capitalism, i.e. the imaginary of the economy. In his article originally 
published in 1986 he notes that the project of social and individual autonomy 
has long since been identified with the liberal doctrine of free market and free 
enterprise whilst the passions for democratic, emancipatory or revolutionary 
project have lost its credibility (p. 222). 
The modern science and technology, Castoriadis argues, are no exception 




have nothing transhistorical about them, have no value that lies beyond question; 
these belong, on the contrary, to the social-historical institution that is capitalism 
as it was born in the West a few centuries ago’ (Castoriadis, 1997a, p. 239). 
Technology and science are invented and employed for the growth of material 
productive power, based on the idea of rational mastery over nature and human 
life.
You know that the domination of this imaginary [of rational mastery] begins 
first via the form of the unlimited expansion of the forces of production —
of ‘wealth’, of ‘capital’. This expansion rapidly becomes the extension and 
the development of the knowledge necessary for increased production, that 
is to say, of technology and science. Finally, the tendency toward ‘rationally’ 
reorganizing and reconstructing all spheres of social life — production, 
administration, education, culture, etc. — transforms the whole institution of 
society and penetrates ever further into all activities.(p. 240, my emphasis)
In short, the modern science and technology are used for the sustained expansion 
of capitalist system. It should be noted that Castoriadis stresses not merely the 
factual dominance of material, capitalist, institutions but also the influence of 
capitalist imaginary significations on the social interpretation of science and 
technology. Indeed, science and technology are called as such insofar as they 
are instruments of capitalist production system. In other words, in the modern 
society, other forms of knowledge and technique are not regarded as equivalent 
to science and technology. 
One should understand this point with care. Castoriadis does not say 
that there are no other knowledge and technique than the capitalist ones. He 
acknowledges the plurality of social imaginary significations as well as the 
plurality of knowledge and technique which are unique to each and every 
institution of society in a different place at a different time (pp. 239-40). What 
he emphasizes here is the specificity of the imaginary that constitutes modernity, 
which centers its value on the development of technology for capitalist 
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production (p. 240). 
The process of instrumentalization of technique and knowledge in 
the modern capitalist society has a significant consequence to the human 
condition. Here Castoriadis’ concern about the modern forms of knowledge and 
technique pertains to what Arendt calls ‘world making’. Arendt argues that the 
construction of the common world, a space in which the plurality of humans 
appears and coexists, is essential to the preservation of social life. The common 
world is constructed by making the world of appearance, that is, through human 
beings’ capacity of representing and giving meaning to reality and of making 
relationship. Arendt herself is critical of the evolution of the modern science 
and technology, especially those developed during and after the Second World 
War. She was well aware of the excessive power of nuclear technology and 
biotechnology, which surpassed the limit of human reflection and control, 
and cautioned that advanced scientific technology might transform the human 
condition, particularly that associated with the capacity of making the common 
world (Arendt, 1958, pp. 2-6). 
The genealogy of knowledge and technique, offered by Castoriadis and 
partly by Arendt, reveals a history in which the life of mankind has become 
subject to the capitalist industrial system in and through the transformation of 
conditions of knowledge and technique in the modern age. Both Castoriadis and 
Arendt contend that the reduction of the horizon of intelligibility and human 
activity to an economic, and utilitarian, principle delimits human capacity 
of constituting the common world. The modern project of rational mastery 
treats nature and human as means of capitalist production and reduces them 
to objects of scientific and technological experiments as well as resources 
for industrial production. For Castoriadis, such situation can be reckoned as 
increased heteronomy, because the modern man has no choice but consuming 
the products of the established system of capitalist society, including education, 
work, politics, and leisure time. For Arendt, this situation implies the decline 
of authentic political life, vita activa, which is necessary for constructing and 




as she observes in the historical moment of the birth of Cartesian cogito (pp. 
280-4), the modern society is founded on the vestige of the breakup of common 
sense, a sense of in-between, to the extent that, in today’s context, the risks of 
advanced scientific technology undermine and transform the security and basis 
of life.
IV. Development against Authentic Notions of Technique and 
Sustainability
Post-development critique stresses that the instrumentalization of 
knowledge and technique has been globalized after the Second World 
War, through the implementation of international development project. In 
particular Serge Latouche elaborates his critique of development by applying 
Arendt’s and Castoriadis’ insights, as well as Ellul’s and Illich’s, to the analysis 
of the problems associated with North-South relations. Latouche argues that 
international development projects are nothing other than a global expansion 
of the modern project of rational mastery that aims at ‘constructing a human 
city based on human reason alone’ (Latouche, 1995, p. 28). He states that the 
modern rationality is predicated on a peculiar principle which he refers to as 
maximine, i.e. obtaining in every domain the best result with the least expense of 
energy (p.28). In other words, maximine is the rationalization principle that can 
be found in every domain of the modern human institutions including politics, 
economy and scientific technology. In this the paradigm of development plays 
a singular role in integrating and regulating economic and techno-scientific 
rationalities to achieve the efficient production of material wealth, i.e. economic 
growth. 
Likewise Latouche sees development projects being subject to what 
Castoriadis calls the imaginary significations of rational mastery and capitalism. 
A number of alternative development paradigms proposed by international 
organizations cannot escape from the prevalence of these imaginary 
significations. From this vantage Latouche criticizes the notion of sustainable 
development as the most significant, and problematic, case. The current 
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ecological crisis perpetrated by economic growth and development urges us to 
change the basis of productivist and consumerist lifestyles of industrial societies. 
This suggests a drastic change of social organization, including modes of 
production and consumption, use and choice of energy resources, and purpose, 
scale and quality of technology. More fundamentally, the ecological crisis 
suggests a change of the goal and ideal of industrial societies. As he stresses, ‘[t]o 
save the planet and assure an acceptable future to our children, it is not only 
necessary to moderate current tendencies, but it is necessary to definitely exit 
development and economism’ (Latouche, 2002, p. 87, my translation).
However, the existing paradigm of sustainable development is ambiguous 
as it allows two types of interpretation: weak sustainability and strong 
sustainability (Adams, 2009, pp. 144-147; Brunel, 2009, p. 60; Flipo, 2007, 
pp. 89-99). The former means sustained economic growth with efficient use 
of natural resource and the latter sustainable reproduction of ecosystems 
and human livelihood. In the international debate, there is a tendency that 
the governments of advanced industrial societies, international financial 
institutions, multinational corporations and mainstream economists follow the 
first interpretation whilst the second, often claimed by indigenous peoples and 
ecologists (e.g. slow food movement) in developed and developing countries, 
remains underrepresented. The international policy regime of sustainable 
development explores artificial management of ecosystem through advanced 
technology and the biological and environmental sciences, without questioning 
the underlying logic and side-effects of growth-based industrial economy, 
such as mass production and overconsumption of resources and corresponding 
rise of ecological footprint. As can be found in the recent discourses of global 
warming and ‘green growth’, the attempt at managing ecological crisis through 
technoscience has resulted in the proliferation of nuclear power plants as an 
alternative to fossil fuel and the application of biotechnology to agribusiness as 
a means of overcoming resource scarcity (Goldman, 2005; Rajan 2006; Shiva 
2008). It also marginalizes the role that traditional knowledge and customs 




to such an extent that the deprivation of their subsistence takes place (Vigna, 
2011). The mainstream sustainable development is thus tethered to the logic of 
profit-driven free market economy: its core value lies in economic sustainability, 
not ecological sustainability. As Vandana Shiva (2008) points out, such tendency 
further separates the economy from the living system and exacerbates Earth’s 
reproductive capacity. Latouche’s distinction between an authentic concept of 
sustainability and the pseudo-idea of sustainable development clearly fits here:
The sustainable character refers not to ‘actually existing’ development, 
but to reproduction. Sustainable reproduction ruled the planet by and large 
until the eighteenth century. [...] This sustainable reproduction does not 
necessarily mean a conservative immobilism. Evolution and growth latent 
in ancient societies are integrated to a large and well moderate mode of 
reproduction, which was always adapted to natural constraints. […] On the 
contrary, the historical and practical signification of development, tied to the 
program of modernity, fundamentally opposes sustainability. What matters 
in development is to exploit, to make valuable objects, to extract profits 
from natural and human resources. The invisible hand and the harmony of 
interests guarantee that everything becomes the best of the best possible 
worlds. (Latouche, 1995, pp. 125-6, my translation)
The existing productivist regime of development and its attempt at 
managing ecological crisis technologically, Latouche cautions, would ferment 
catastrophe (Latouche, 2010, Ch.1). The nature of catastrophe can be both intra- 
and inter-generational. It is intra-generational because overexploitation and 
overconsumption of natural resources, chiefly by advanced industrial societies, 
accumulates unsustainable degree of ecological footprints and threatens the 
environment and livelihood of developing countries. It is intergenerational 
because the ecological crisis induced by the present modes of production and 
consumption exacerbates survival and life chances of future generations. Hence 
the actually existing development does not meet the conditions of sustainability.
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Latouche’s concern about sustainability and intra- and inter-generational 
justice comes from his reflections on the reproductive capacity of ecosystem 
and human societies. However, there is another dimension he does not fully 
elaborate, though implicit in his work, given the influence of Arendt and 
Castoriadis. I call that dimension a political condition of sustainability, which 
is understood in terms of the intra- and inter-generational distribution of the 
possibility of action. I shall explain this point in line with Arendt’s political 
philosophy. In her reflections on three categories of the human condition (i.e. 
labor, work, and action), Arendt introduces the concept of history and stresses 
the role that action plays in constituting the common world: 
All three activities [i.e. labor, work, and action] and their corresponding 
conditions are intimately connected with the most general condition of 
human existence: birth and death, natality and mortality. Labor assures not 
only individual survival, but the life of the species. Work and its product, 
the human artifact, bestow a measure of permanence and durability upon 
the futility of mortal life and the fleeting character of human time. Action, in 
so far as it engages in founding and preserving political bodies, creates the 
condition for remembrance, that is, for history. Labor and work, as well as 
action, are also rooted in natality in so far as they have the task to provide 
and preserve the world for, to foresee and reckon with, the constant influx of 
newcomers who are bon into the world as strangers. However, of the three, 
action has the closest connection with the human condition of natality; 
the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only 
because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, 
that is, of acting. (Arendt, 1958, p. 9, my emphasis)
The common world of humans, the space where the life of each and every person 
is preserved, assumes that the possibility of acting, i.e. of doing something new, 
is reserved for newcomers. The role of politics is to guarantee this possibility, 




this passage by Arendt as a general political condition for intergenerational 
justice, that is, a political condition of sustainability.
As is explicit in her later work, Arendt argues in line with Kant’s theory 
of judgment that the establishment of communicability and common sense is 
the condition sine qua non for making the common world (Arendt, 1971, pp. 
255-272). In particular she lays emphasis on the role of spectators. In making the 
community of coexistence, each and every human being has to act as a spectator 
and to present oneself in front of a manifold other spectators: ‘Nothing and 
nobody exists in the world whose very being does not presuppose a spectator’ (p. 
19). The political condition of sustainability, therefore, means that one must act 
in front of the future generations qua spectators, acknowledging them as equal 
members of the human world who share the earth and societies with us.
Now, to sum up this section, let us evaluate the existing productivist regime 
of development and technology through the lens of the political condition of 
sustainability. The prevailing regime of development is problematic because it 
destroys the political basis of sustainability. As already discussed, the modern 
development model, with its core value of rational mastery over nature and 
humans, rationalizes knowledge and technique for the purpose of unlimited 
economic growth. This impoverishes the meaning of technique, knowledge 
and human communication, and confines the possibility of human activities to 
the existing system of growth-based economy. Hence the possibility of action, 
practice of making the common world, becomes restrained by the logic of 
economy. 
More important, the contemporary capitalist economy driven by the 
discourses of neoliberal globalization and sustainable development expands 
their forces on the basis of the rationality of its own. The problem lies in that 
the rationality of capitalism neither symbolizes nor counts the lives of future 
generations in their singularities; it reduces future generations to abstract figure 
of rational economic man and does not constitute common-world relationships 
with them. Put it in Arendt’s term, the existing development model premised on 
economic globalization and technological control of nature and humans does 
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not acknowledge the future generations as spectators, and it excludes them from 
the sphere of politics and eventually deprives them of the possibility of acting 
politically. It can be said that a series of industrial disasters, especially nuclear 
accidents such as Chernobyl and Fukushima, illustrate such violation of the 
political condition of sustainability. In particular, and this is my contention, such 
violation is accelerated by the rationalization and loss of the authentic meaning 
of technique, i.e. teukhein, which enacts the possibilisation of being.
V. Conclusion: Towards a Post-development Ethics of Technology
This paper examined the legitimacy of the modern paradigm of 
development, mainly investigating the problems associated with the issues 
concerning technology. The paper demonstrated that the issues concerning 
technology is not reducible to efficiency or know-how of particular instruments 
used for particular economic or scientific activities; on the contrary, validity, 
effectiveness and legitimacy of technology needs to be examined through the 
lens of its original conception: teukhein. The original notion of technique refers 
to capacity of constituting the human world and the possibility of acting and 
doing. Such capacity of human action concerns itself with the domain of politics, 
therefore technology, and more generally technique, needs to be discussed in the 
light of its contribution to intra- and inter-generational distribution of capacity 
of constituting the common world. From this vantage the political condition 
of sustainability is defined as sustainable reproduction and distribution of 
autonomy.
Such understanding of technological issues leads us to reconsider the 
Japanese debate on denuclearization in the time of the Fukushima crisis. Since 
the Fukushima accident, the issue of denuclearization is often discussed as 
a matter of choosing particular technology of power generation, e.g. nuclear 
energy, liquid natural gas or renewable energy. This exemplifies that the 
framework of the debate a priori presupposes a narrow, modern, notion of 
technology. However, if we accept the authentic notion of technique, then the 




manner of ordering society, including everyday human relations and capabilities 
of the future generations. The effectiveness, validity and legitimacy of particular 
energy resource and technology, be they nuclear or renewable energy, must be 
examined from such authentic understanding of technique. In short, the path to 
post-nuclear society presupposes the dismantling of the modern conception of 
technique, i.e. technology.
To conclude the discussion, I suggest ethical and political issues needed 
for further elaboration in the field of development ethics. First, the Fukushima 
crisis urges us to face and acknowledge a breakup of ethical foundation of our 
society, what Bernard Williams calls confidence. Williams defines confidence 
as socially shared set of practice and explanation on the value of society one 
belongs to (Williams, 1985, pp. 185-9). From Three Mile islands to Chernobyl 
to Fukushima, humanity has experienced the irremediable risks involved in the 
technology-driven industrial societies. The Fukushima accident not merely has 
provoked a nationwide debate on denuclearization. Today, the post-war Japanese 
development model producing multifarious victims in the peripheries receives 
severe criticisms and reflections, whereas the government and the industrial 
world continuously produce discourses of erasing bodily experiences, voices and 
memories of those victims. One possible interpretation of the current situation 
may be this: the Fukushima accident hit the hitherto shared confidence in the 
productivist development model and laid bare a situation in which it is difficult 
to maintain a national consensus on the prospect of energy policy and social 
development including the recovery plan from the March 11 earthquake and 
tsunami. The Japanese society is at a crossroads, with the proliferation of popular 
discourses searching alternative social values and goals amidst the government-
led conservative movement towards economic growth policy (e.g. participation 
to the TPP negotiation and exportation of nuclear power plants). Here comes 
the pertinence of Williams’ ethical relativism, which states that, if we are not 
confident that future generations share our values, and if these values are not 
objective, then ‘[w]e should not try to seal determinate values into future society’ 
(p. 192). We must acknowledge the limits of the development model based on 
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productivism and consumerism and let the future generations enjoy freedom of 
using resources and create their own life chances.
Second, the acknowledgement of the breakup of confidence must 
accompany the transformation of the existing organization of society. It is 
needed to reconstruct the Japanese society on a totally different logic from 
the hitherto dominating industrial system. On this point various proposals by 
post-development critique, and especially de-growth (i.e. décroissance), will 
serve as a frame of reference. De-growth aims to break with the paradigms 
of productivism and economic growth by introducing ecology-based social 
activities to the prevailing industrial system. It seeks to change the logic of 
organizing society, in ways the economy is re-embedded in a web of social 
relations rooted to surrounding bioregions (Latouche, 2006). More important, 
the core value of de-growth is to reactivate a sense of limits. Putting limits 
to productivism, consumerism and corresponding structural violence such as 
exploitation of nature and humans constitutes an ethics of de-growth (Latouche, 
2010, Ch.3). De-growth seeks to dismantle the imaginary significations of 
rational mastery and capitalism, which govern the modern society, and opens 
up alternative possibilities of doing and acting. It is argued that the issue of 
technique runs through the whole theme of de-growth. The project of de-growth, 
and more generally post-development, needs to be further examined in the light 
of the authentic notion of technique.
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Post-development and Questions Concerning Technique:
 In the Time of the Fukushima Crisis
<Summary>
Yoshihiro Nakano
This article examines the problems associated with the modern paradigm 
of development through the lens of post-development critique of technique. 
Drawing on Cornelius Castoriadis’ reflection on the ancient Greek notion of 
technique, author elucidates the relationship between technique and politics: 
technique is closely associated with capacity of constituting the human world. 
From this vantage the article examines the modern technology, especially its 
value and meaning in the culture of modernity. It illuminates how the modern 
technology obliterates the authentic notion of technique and serves as a means 
for the expansion of global capitalism. Author contends in line with Serge 
Latouche and Hannah Arendt that the technology-driven industrial economy 
undermines not only ecological and social but also political condition of 
sustainability. Author concludes the article by presenting ethical and political 
challenges to be tackled in the context of the Fukushima crisis.

